A Strategic Analysis of the 1005 Sung-Liao War
Lau, Nap-yin
Academia Sinica
35th Meeting of the PIAC, Taipei 1992
From late 1004 to early 1005, the largest Khitan invasion ever since 946 shocked the Sung. Under the command of Dowager Empress Hsiao and Emperor Sheng-tsung, reportedly 200,000 crack troops penetrated Hopei in sixty days, reaching the out skirts of Shan-yuan (or Shan-chou, modern P’u-yang), less than 400 miles away from K’ai-feng, where it met the Sung counterattack headed by Chen-tsung. Why did the Khitans choose this time to invade? What were their goals? Why did they finally accept a peace settlement? These questions may be answered strategically from the perspective of the Liao.
After taking revenge on Sung T’ai-tsung’s two massive invasions, the Khitans had three feasible alternatives to deal with the Sung. First, to continue their preemptive warfare across the Sung borders. Second, to wait for sincere Sung initiatives for peace. Third, to achieve a most advantageous peace by means of war. The first two alternatives, however, became impossible to carry out, due to the strengthening of Sung defense and the closing of border markets which had served as the informal channel to peace negotiation. As a result, the Liao was left only with the third alternative to war.
During the war, the unusually cold weather was exceptionally helpful to the Liao. The artificial swamps and waterways which the Sung relied on to hamper the Khitan cavalry turned into thick ice, enabling the Khitans to successfully carry out their blitz attacks. When the hesitant Chen-tsung finally decided to go to the front, the Khitans had already been plundering the outskirts of Shan-yuan. The city was too small to even house the Sung imperial armies, its defense was carelessly finished just one day before the Khitans arrived, and the military provisions were hardly sufficient. As one high-ranking official later put it, Chen-tsung was being trapped in an endangered city. For tun ately for the Sung, the Khitan army-chief was killed accidentally, and recent combats showed that the Sung forces were stronger than expected. Uncertain of victory and fearful of being besieged, the Liao was willing to negotiate peace. Aware of its drawbacks, so was the Sung. It was under these strategic considerations that the peace accord of 1005 was concluded.